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Foreign entry and bank competition are modeled as the interaction between asymmetrically
informed principals: the entrant uses collateral as a screening device to contest the incumbent￿ s
informational advantage. Both better information ex ante and stronger legal protection ex
post are shown to facilitate the entry of low-cost outside competitors into credit markets. The
entrant￿ s success in gaining borrowers of higher quality by o⁄ering cheaper loans increases with
its e¢ ciency (cost) advantage. This paper accounts for evidence suggesting that foreign banks
tend to lend more to large ￿rms thereby neglecting small and medium enterprises. The results
also explain why this observed "bias" is stronger in emerging markets.
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11 Introduction
Traditional theories of ￿nancial intermediation assert that information asymmetries are central to
bank lending. Prospective borrowers typically know more about their ability to repay loans than
lenders do. Accordingly, banks screen borrowers to select high-quality entrepreneurs and reduce risk
of default among low quality ones. A more recent literature on relationship lending takes the view
that repeated interactions can reduce such information asymmetries between bank and borrower
(see references in Boot, 2004). According to this view, banks gain "knowledge" about payo⁄-
relevant borrower attributes during the course of a lending relationship. Consequently, relationships
emerge as a prime source of an incumbent bank￿ s comparative advantage over potential outside
lenders. This undermines competition in credit markets; the incumbent￿ s superior information
about its own clients weakens a competitor￿ s ability to o⁄er credit at lower interest rates.
The purpose of this paper is to understand how this problem a⁄ects foreign entry and lend-
ing behavior in credit markets.1 Banks are modeled as asymmetrically informed principals: the
incumbent has complete information about borrower credit-risk, but the entrant does not.2 This
relies on the notion that much of the information regarding a borrower￿ s unobservable risk can only
be obtained in the process of lending (Boot and Thakor 1994, 2000). This paper studies competi-
tion between an entrant bank (uninformed lender) that faces observationally identical borrowers,
who can be one of two types (high-risk or low-risk), and an incumbent (informed lender) that can
distinguish between these borrower types.
In addition, banks may require the borrower to secure loans with collateral. Interestingly, both
theoretical and empirical ￿ndings have shown that collateral requirements fall over the duration
of the bank-borrower relationship (Boot and Thakor, 1994; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and
Udell 1995; Harho⁄ and K￿rting, 1998). This contrast between secured lending for new borrowers
1The intention here (and in the title of the paper) is to use the term "foreign" in the broad sense of the word.
As Morgan and Strahan (2004, p. 241) observe, "In the United States, banks from other states were long viewed
as foreign, and most states strictly forbade entry by banks from other states until the mid-1970s. Even banks from
other cities within a state were often blocked from opening branches in other cities in the state. Loosely speaking,
the hometown bank was local, and banks from anywhere else were foreign."
2At the outset, it is important to emphasize that borrower risk here refers to the unobservable component in
credit-risk, as opposed to observable risk, that is readily evaluated from company ￿nancial statements and credit
reports. This paper considers de novo foreign entry in terms of outside banks setting up a branch or a subsidiary in
a new location. The analysis presented here abstracts from alternative modes of entry like mergers and acquisitions,
and from situations that describe the complementarities between informed (bank) capital and uninformed capital
(Morgan et al. 2004; Morgan and Strahan, 2005).
2and unsecured lending for established ones is suggestive of the information content in collateral
requirements (Sharpe, 1990; Boot and Thakor, 1994). Relevant to the discussion here is the impli-
cation that this role of secured credit assumes greater importance for an entrant seeking to create
new relationships than for an incumbent lending to its established clients. Accordingly, this paper
uses a screening model, based on Besanko and Thakor (1987a, hereafter B-T), to examine the
entrant￿ s use of collateral as a screening device to contest the incumbent￿ s informational advantage.
The results indicate that both ex ante better information and ex post stronger legal protection
can facilitate the entry of low-cost outside competitors into credit markets. Market segments
characterized by a greater proportion of high-risk borrowers frustrate the entrant￿ s ability to pool
borrowers. On the other hand, poor legal protection can prevent the use of collateral as an e⁄ective
means to successfully sort borrowers. In this model, both pooling and separating equilibria are
shown to exist. Importantly, the entrant￿ s success in gaining borrowers of higher quality (lower risk)
by o⁄ering cheaper loans increases with its cost advantage. Three major results are summarized
here. First, for small cost advantages, the entrant cannot attract both risk types either by pooling
or by sorting. Consequently, it succeeds in capturing high-risk borrowers but not the low-risk
ones. Second, both the entrant￿ s success in pooling borrowers and its pro￿ts from such pooling
contracts are increasing in its cost advantage. Therefore, even with a moderate cost advantage, the
entrant can successfully pool all borrowers, but only in market segments characterized by a higher
fraction of low-risk borrowers. This result of the model helps in understanding the di⁄erences in
observed lending behavior of entrants and incumbents in di⁄erent market segments. It indicates
how incumbents are likely to retain clients in riskier segments of the market when faced with more
e¢ cient outside competitors that can provide cheaper loans. Third, entry into sectors characterized
by stronger information asymmetries requires a su¢ ciently large cost advantage, so that the entrant
can successfully sort borrowers. The magnitude of this cost advantage is shown to depend on the
legal and institutional features of the host country. As discussed below, this result formalizes a link
between ￿nancial development and the legal and informational environment in which lenders and
borrowers operate.
The theoretical results obtained here ￿nd support in empirical ￿ndings on entry into credit
markets both across states within the US (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1998) and across countries of
3the world (Claessens et al. 2001; Beck et al. 2004). The model developed here also o⁄ers a new
insight for analyzing some of the evidence that has received wide attention in recent empirical
studies on (foreign) entry in banking. Claessens et al. (2001) show that the e⁄ect of foreign
entry is very di⁄erent in developed versus developing countries. An important concern in this
context is the evidence suggestive of the possibility that foreign (and large national) banks have
di¢ culty extending loans to informationally opaque small ￿rms (Stiglitz, 2000; Berger et al. 2001,
2005). This evidence, which appears stronger in emerging markets, has led some policymakers to
believe that foreign banks ￿cream skim￿or ￿cherry pick￿ , leaving the worst risks to the domestic
banks.3 This paper provides an integrated theoretical framework to examine these issues and their
implications for policy and institutions (see Section 4 for details).
Theory predicts that collateral can help sort observationally identical borrowers: entrepreneurs
with lower risk of default post higher collateral that is unattractive to high-risks (Bester, 1985;
Besanko and Thakor, 1987 a,b; Dell￿ Ariccia and Marquez, 2005). Clearly, such predictions are based
on unobservable risk, and the di¢ culty in estimating such adverse selection models lies in ￿nding
direct measures of unobservable risk characteristics.4 The representation of banks as asymmetrically
informed principals helps in getting around this problem. Here, a borrower￿ s unobservable risk is
known only to the incumbent (from previous lending relationships), while a borrower￿ s observable
risk is common knowledge. Therefore, by analyzing di⁄erences in the equilibrium behavior of
asymmetrically informed banks, one can generate testable predictions on collateral use that depend
on unobservable risk characteristics.
The work most closely related to this paper is Dell￿ Ariccia and Marquez (2004, hereafter D-
M), in which an entrant becomes a victim of the ￿winner￿ s curse￿ because of the incumbent￿ s
informational advantage. The entrant is unable to distinguish between ￿lemons￿rejected by the
incumbent and new borrowers shopping around for lower interest rates (Broecker, 1990; Dell￿ Ariccia
et al. 1999). An interesting feature of these models is that the incumbent successfully retains
all of its creditworthy clients, and therefore, the entrant e⁄ectively competes for new borrowers
3Racocha (2003) observes that, "In the Czech Republic, the privatization of banks had been delayed ... by the
experience with foreign banks that were entering the market since 1992 and cherry-picking their clients."
4On the other hand, testing empirical predictions based on observable risk is relatively simpler. Empirical evidence
on pre-loan credit analysis reveals that commercial lenders require the observably risky borrowers to pledge more
collateral (Orgler 1970, Scott and Smith 1986, Berger and Udell 1990, 1992, 1995, Brick et al., 2005). This mitigates
lenders￿problems of moral hazard and strategic default (Boot et al. 1991).
4only.5 Yet, at any given time, the number of new entrepreneurs seeking credit may be small when
compared to the number of existing ￿rms in the market. As a result, the entrant￿ s success on
entry may depend on its ability to attract clients away from the incumbent. Indeed, as Jayaratne
and Strahan (1998, p. 240) note, a ￿natural process of selection￿occurs when ￿better-managed,
lower-cost banks expand at the expense of ine¢ cient ones.￿Accordingly, this paper aims to study
competition over the incumbent￿ s ￿captive￿and creditworthy borrowers and the entrant￿ s ability to
attract creditworthy clients away from the incumbent. To this end, I consider a situation where the
incumbent￿ s informational advantage extends to all borrowers. Unlike D-M (2004), banks are armed
with the use of collateral requirements in their contracts. The use of collateral is important in this
context. First, Morgan and Strahan (2004) observe that foreign banks respond more elastically to
collateral shocks than domestic banks.6 Second, Tornell and Westermann (2004) ￿nd that collateral
is viewed as a signi￿cant obstacle to obtaining bank credit in most middle income countries.
Why is removing entry barriers to competition important for credit market e¢ ciency? This
paper follows Rajan and Zingales (2003, p.19) in their characterization of ￿a more e¢ cient ￿nancial
system￿ as one that ￿facilitates entry, and thus leads to lower pro￿ts for incumbent ￿rms and
￿nancial institutions.￿While there is almost no opposition to the idea that an e¢ cient ￿nancial
system is one that helps new ￿rms obtain external ￿nance, theory o⁄ers competing hypotheses about
whether competition among ￿nancial institutions (like banks) is bene￿cial for economic activity
(Gorton and Winton, 2003). In contrast, a large body of empirical evidence argues that relaxing
entry restrictions in banking helps both new and mature ￿rms obtain external ￿nance (Jayaratne
and Strahan, 1996, 1998; Black and Strahan, 2002; Cetorelli and Strahan, 2004).7 Indeed, any
5Dell￿ Arricia and Marquez (2005) study lending booms and ￿nancial distress in situations where banks use collat-
eral to sort unknown borrowers. Here too, banks are unable to poach pro￿tably from the pool of borrowers known
to their rivals.
6Morgan and Strahan (2004) use the value of a country￿ s traded equity as a proxy for the value of potential
collateral. Elsewhere, the use of collateral is pervasive in bank lending as reported in empirical studies for US (Berger
and Udell, 1990), UK (Black et al., 1996) and Germany (Harho⁄ and K￿rting, 1998). The importance of collateral in
theoretical studies on bank loans is best understood when one considers the bankruptcy literature; there, bank debt
is synonymous with secured debt, as opposed to public debt, that tends to be unsecured (Gertner and Scharfstein,
1991; James, 1996).
7Indeed Cetorelli and Strahan (2004, p. 26) assert that recent empirical evidence on this debate is unambiguous,
"While theory does not paint a clear picture about how competition in banking ought to a⁄ect the ￿rm-size distri-
bution, the empirical work does. Comparing industry structure across local markets within the U.S., or comparing
structure across a large number of countries (both developed and developing), one reaches the same conclusion. ...
banks with market power erect an important ￿nancial barrier to entry to the detriment of the entrepreneurial sector
of the economy, perhaps in part to protect the pro￿tability of their existing borrowers."
5theory that seeks to explain the determinants of e¢ cient ￿nancial systems must account for entry
barriers to new ￿nancial institutions.
A growing literature suggests that a country￿ s institutions a⁄ect ￿nancial development (Beck
and Levine, 2005). Among the most prominent are empirical studies by La Porta et al. (1997,
2000), which show that better legal protection against expropriation by insiders increases the ef-
￿ciency of ￿nancial systems (both corporate ￿nancing and development of ￿nancial institutions).
For corporate ￿nancing, their hypothesis follows from theories on corporate governance (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997). In contrast, the precise channel through which a country￿ s legal institutions
a⁄ect the development of its ￿nancial institutions (like banks) is less well formalized.8 Why, for
instance, might stronger creditor rights lead to a more e¢ cient banking system? In terms of the
characterization of an e¢ cient ￿nancial system as one that facilitates entry, how might better
legal protection assist in the entry of low-cost competitors? This model formalizes a precise chan-
nel through which a country￿ s legal environment a⁄ects the e¢ ciency of its ￿nancial markets by
facilitating (or discouraging) the entry of low-cost, outside competitors.
Before describing the details of this model, I sketch the intuition. Interestingly, theoretical
studies that demonstrate collateral use as a screening device also assume that collateral is costly
(Bester, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987a, b; Boot et al., 1991). Banks incur a dissipative cost in
taking possession of and liquidating collateral. Consequently, the lender valuation of collateral is
typically lower than that of the borrower (Barro, 1976). Given that collateral is costly for a bank,
better information on borrower credit-risk (gained in the course of a bank-borrower relationship)
reduces a bank￿ s incentive to secure loans with collateral. This is consistent with the ￿ndings that
collateral requirements fall over the duration of the bank-borrower relationship. It also implies
that in markets with poorer borrower quality overall, collateral assumes greater importance for
entrants than for incumbents. Stronger legal protection reduces the deadweight losses of seizing
and liquidating collateral and this enables an entrant to bid more aggressively by screening the
incumbent￿ s clients. In contrast, weak legal protection discriminates against the uninformed entrant
because it reduces the e¢ cacy of collateral use. The model formalizes how variations in law and
8For example, Castro et al. (2004) study the impact of investor protection on economic growth, while Levine
(1998, 1999) traces the empirical linkages between legal environment, banking development and economic growth.
However, these papers point to no theoretical work that formalizes the linkages between a country￿ s legal environment
and the development of its ￿nancial institutions.
6its enforcement are central to the e¢ ciency and growth of ￿nancial markets in general (La Porta
et al. 1997, 2000), and the banking sector in particular (Levine 1998, 1999).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic model. It eliminates
a set of dominated strategies for both principals (incumbent and entrant bank). When competing
with its rival, a bank will never play from the set of dominated strategies. Section 3 analyzes the
equilibria under bank competition. Sections 4 and 5 provide a discussion of the results. All proofs
are in the appendix.
2 The Model
I consider a risk-neutral economy in which each entrepreneur has unconstrained access to collateral.9
The entrepreneur can borrow $1 from a bank and invest in a project that yields revenue x with
probability (1 ￿ ￿) and zero with probability ￿. Following B-T (1987a), a debt contract speci￿es a
repayment R to the lender if the project is successful, and an amount of collateral C(￿ 0) to be paid
to the lender if the project fails; this contract is denoted as (R;C). As in Barro (1976), I assume
a disparity in collateral valuation between borrower and lender by de￿ning the lender￿ s valuation
of collateral as ￿C, where 0 ￿ ￿ < 1. The project involves a ￿xed non-monetary cost U0 for the
entrepreneur (the opportunity cost of her time). Lenders are assumed to have a perfectly elastic
supply of funds and I denote the bank￿ s cost of these funds by ￿. The entrepreneur￿ s expected utility
is U0 if she does not borrow, and U(R;C;￿) = (1￿￿)(x￿R)￿￿C if she borrows under the contract
(R;C). The bank￿ s payo⁄from contract (R;C) is given by ￿(R;C;￿) = (1￿￿)R+￿￿C￿￿ if it lends
and 0 otherwise. The surplus generated from a loan contract (R;C) is [(1￿￿)x￿￿￿U0]￿(1￿￿)￿C.
Accordingly, when a bank uses a contract with a positive collateral requirement C(> 0), there is a
deadweight loss of social surplus in the order of (1 ￿ ￿)￿C. Banks face a ￿xed pool of borrowers
consisting of two types: fraction ￿ of borrowers are high-risk (￿ = ￿H) and fraction 1 ￿ ￿ are low-
risk types (￿ = ￿L), with 0 < ￿L < ￿H < 1. I assume (1 ￿ ￿H)x > ￿ + U0 to ensure that all
(zero-collateral) loan contracts generate positive social surplus.
Using the setup described above, I model competition between an entrant bank (Bank E) and
9This assumption ensures that there are no distortions from endowment constraints. I assume that the collateral
pledged is tied to production so that liquidating collateral to self-￿nance the project is never preferred to the bank
loan (Boot et al., 1991).
7an incumbent that (pre-entry) is a price setting monopolist (Bank I). These banks di⁄er on two
counts. First, they have di⁄erent costs of funds; Bank E￿ s cost of funds is ￿E, while Bank I￿ s cost of
funds is ￿I. I assume that these di⁄erences in the banks￿cost of funds arise because the two banks
di⁄er in their e¢ ciencies of converting deposits to loans (Freixas and Rochet, 1997, p. 51). Second,
they are asymmetrically informed about borrower types; Bank I can distinguish between a high-risk
and a low-risk borrower, while Bank E cannot.10 Stated di⁄erently, the information asymmetry
in this model arises from the assumption that entrepreneurs have private information about ￿,
which can only be obtained by banks in the course of a lending relationship. Like Dell￿ Ariccia et
al. (1999, p. 515.), I ￿have in mind a situation where the existing banks (i.e., ￿incumbent￿ ) in
a market have an informational advantage over other potential lenders (i.e., ￿entrant￿ ) by virtue
of their established relationships with borrowers seeking credit...￿ . In short, this model studies
bank competition as competition between asymmetrically informed non-identical principals.11 The
information asymmetry discussed here is only restricted to distinguishing between borrower types.
The payo⁄ functions of banks (their cost of funds, ￿E and ￿I) and the distribution of borrower
types in the population (the value of ￿) are common knowledge. If one denotes a bank￿ s pro￿ts


















L). Also, borrower k￿ s utility from loan (R;C) can be written as
Uk(R;C) ￿ U(R;C;￿k), k = H;L.
I begin with a discussion of a single bank. A monopolist bank never requires a borrower to secure
a loan with collateral. Under both complete and incomplete information, collateral is an ine¢ cient
sorting device for a single bank, and is optimally set to zero (B-T, 1987a). The key to a monopolist
bank using collateral to sort borrowers lies in relaxing the assumption that borrowers￿reservation
utilities are type-independent. Freixas and Rochet (1997) consider a situation of countervailing
incentives where borrowers￿ exogenous reservation utilities are type-dependent￿ the opportunity
10This stylized assumption follows Bond and Gresik (1997), and is intended to focus attention on situations where
the entrant competes over the incumbent￿ s existing clients.
11Several theoretical models have analyzed competition between symmetrically uninformed principals under perfect
competition (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976), in duopolistic settings (Biglaiser and Mezzetti 1993, 2000) and in common
agency environments (Bernheim and Whinston 1985, 1986). Although Bond and Gresik (1997) analyze situations
of common agency, to the best of my knowledge, theirs is the only other paper to study equilibrium behavior for
principals that are asymmetrically informed about agents￿preferences.
8cost of the e¢ cient (low-risk) agent U0











They argue that countervailing incentives, as given by (1), are needed to model an uninformed
monopolistic lender that uses collateral as a screening device. This model endogenizes the situation
of countervailing incentives by analyzing competition between asymmetrically informed principals.
Theoretically, this helps in modeling the entrant￿ s use of collateral as a screening device to contest
the incumbent￿ s information advantage.
Next, I consider contracts under complete information for both the entrant and the incumbent.
Note that collateral is an ine¢ cient sorting device and, under complete information, is optimally
set to zero. Therefore, (complete information) contracts with zero collateral requirements are ￿rst-
best because they maximize social surplus. I de￿ne ￿ R
j
k to be the ￿rst-best maximum repayment
that Bank j can charge borrower k by providing her reservation utility U0, where k = H;L and
j = I;E. Analogously, R
ﬂ
j
k is the ￿rst-best minimum repayment that bank j can charge under

















, where k = H;L and j = I;E. (3)
While maximum repayment ￿ R
j




k depends on Bank j￿ s cost of funds ￿j, j = I;E. Also, a monopolist bank with
complete information would charge ￿ Rk given by (2), whereas the competitive equilibrium under






, given in (3).
Banks as asymmetrically informed principals Turning to the characterization of banks as
asymmetrically informed principals, one observes that Bank I￿ s information advantage allows it to
charge borrower k any repayment in [R
ﬂ
I
k(￿I); ￿ Rk] and still break even (or better). However, Bank
E cannot charge any repayment in [R
ﬂ
E
k (￿E); ￿ Rk] because it cannot identify borrower types. For
9example, Bank E￿ s expected pro￿ts from its o⁄er (R
ﬂ
E
L(￿E);0) to low-risks would always be nega-




L(￿E);0) is a dominated strategy for Bank E.
I start by eliminating contracts for each bank that are strictly dominated. In doing so, I describe
the sets of contracts that each bank can o⁄er in competition. For the incumbent bank, let ZI
k(￿I)
denote the set of these contracts (RI
k;CI
k), one for each borrower type, k = H;L. Similarly, the
set ZE(￿E) consists of the entrant￿ s o⁄ers. This set includes both the set of pooling contracts
(RE
P;CE
P ) (subscript P for "pooling"), denoted by ZE





L)], denoted by ZE
S (￿E) (subscript S for "separating"). Finally, I characterize
the equilibrium for all possible values of ￿I and ￿E.12 All proofs are given in Appendix A.
Incumbent Bank First, since Bank I can identify borrower type, it will optimally set the
collateral requirement to zero in all its o⁄ers. Second, it is a dominated strategy for Bank I to o⁄er
a contract with ￿I
k < 0. If ￿I
k < 0 for some k, then Bank I could pro￿tably withdraw this contract
and shed the borrowers of type k. Lemma 1 characterizes Bank I￿ s set of o⁄ers in ZI
k(￿I).







k(￿I); ￿ Rk]g where R
ﬂ
I
k(￿I) and ￿ Rk are the incumbent￿ s ￿rst-best maximum and ￿rst-best
minimum repayments respectively, k = H;L.
The stylized result of zero collateral requirements in the incumbent￿ s contract is intended to
capture a simple feature of credit markets: collateral requirements fall as banks know more about
a borrower￿ s credit-risk. To summarize, I can restrict my attention to Bank I￿ s o⁄er from the
set ZI
L(￿I) for low-risk borrowers and the set ZI
H(￿I) for high-risk types. From (2) and (3), I get






1￿￿k, k = H;L. Contract (R
ﬂ
I
k(￿I);0) yields borrower k the maximum
utility Bank I can provide, denoted ￿ UI
k(￿I), and is de￿ned by
￿ UI
k(￿I) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿k)x ￿ ￿I. (4)
Entrant Bank Bank E faces borrowers whose participation constraints are determined by the
12An alternative approach could be to compute best response correspondences for each bank. This approach is
considerably more complicated and the model becomes less tractable; for example, Bank E￿ s best response to Bank
I￿ s o⁄er of U
I
H to H-types and U
I
L to L-types would need to be computed for all possible values of ￿
I and ￿
E.
10utility from contracts o⁄ered by Bank I. Therefore, in eliminating dominated strategies for the
entrant, I do not use participation constraints explicitly.13 Note that under competition, high-
risk borrowers have the incentive to mimic low-risk ones.14 A standard result follows: there is no
distortion from ￿rst-best in the uninformed principal￿ s contract for the ine¢ cient agent (high-risk
borrower). Bank E never requires high-risks to secure their loans with collateral, i.e., CE
H = 0
(Appendix A.2). This holds true for both pooling and separating contracts.15 Bank E￿ s break-even


















k (￿E) denotes Bank E￿ s ￿rst-best minimum repayments for borrower k. Bank E￿ s expected
pro￿ts from (Rmin
P (￿E);0) are zero; it subsidizes loans to high-risk borrowers with pro￿ts from low-
risk ones. The entrant￿ s pooling contracts are summarized in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 The entrant￿ s o⁄er of a pooling contract is from the set ZE








P (￿E); ￿ RH]g where Rmin
P (￿E) is the minimum the entrant can charge in a pooling contract
subject to breaking even.
The next result characterizes Bank E￿ s separating contracts by the following Lemma.
Lemma 3 The entrant￿ s o⁄er of separating contracts [(RE
H;0);(RE
L;CE
L)] in the set ZE
S (￿E)
must satisfy:
















13When we show that the menu of contracts M is strictly dominated by a menu N (i.e., the entrant￿ s pro￿ts from
N are strictly greater than pro￿ts from M), we also show that menu N yields both borrower types at least as much
utility as menu M. In this process of eliminating dominated strategies, it is implicit that if menu M satis￿es the
relevant participation constraints for both borrower types, so does menu N.
14Under competition, principals o⁄er agents more of the surplus so as to prevent competing principals from luring
them away. Since the surplus generated from borrower-L is greater than that from borrower-H, high-risks have the
incenitve to mimic low-risks to obtain the greater surplus.






































P ). Note that our assertion in footnote 13 holds true.
11Result (a) follows from the single-crossing property.16 Result (b) follows from Bank E￿ s choice
to lend. Finally, if ￿E
L < 0 in any menu [(RE
H;0);(RE
L;CE
L)] that satis￿es (a) and (b), then Bank
E can always pro￿tably withdraw the contract for L-types. If L-types now select the remaining
contract for H-types, Bank E￿ s expected pro￿ts from both types will be positive. This gives (c).
In summary, I will de￿ne the set of contracts that Bank E can o⁄er by ZE(￿E) = ZE
P (￿) [ ZE
S (￿)
where ZE
P (￿) and ZE
S (￿) are given by Lemmas 2 and 3.
3 Bank competition
The timing of events is as follows. Nature selects borrower types and while Bank I observes this,
Bank E does not. Banks move ￿rst, simultaneously, anticipating agents￿subsequent behavior,
and optimizing accordingly within the set of contracts. Bank I sets out two contracts, one for
each type, from ZI
k(￿I), k = H;L. Bank E o⁄ers any contract in ZE(￿E). Each entrepreneur
chooses the contract that maximizes her ex ante expected utility. For example, the low-risk entre-
preneur selects from Bank I￿ s o⁄er in ZI








L)], borrower L can choose either contract in this menu or Bank I￿ s o⁄er of
(RI
L;CI
L) to low-risk types. Finally, contracts are executed.
I focus exclusively on pure strategy equilibria. An equilibrium of this game is a menu of contracts
such that each bank￿ s choice of menu maximizes its expected pro￿ts given the contracts o⁄ered by
the other bank and the maximizing choices of the borrowers. As is standard in the principal-agent
literature, I will assume that if the borrower is indi⁄erent between two loan contracts o⁄ered by
the same bank, she chooses the one that the bank prefers. Also, if a borrower is indi⁄erent between
contracts o⁄ered by the incumbent and the entrant, in equilibrium she borrows from the bank that
makes higher pro￿ts from the contract.17
16If IC H is slack, Bank E can provide the L-type borrowers a new contract with a higher R and a lower C and
increase its pro￿ts. If the new contract yields the L-types the same utility as the old contract, it must yield the
H-types strictly greater utility. This follows from the single-crossing property: H-type￿ s preference for a contract
with a higher R and a lower C is greater compared to the L-type. Since we start from a position where IC H is slack,
we can ￿nd such a new contract that still satis￿es this constraint for the high-risk borrower. Also, Bank E will prefer
the new contract (with a higher R and a lower C) since it yields higher pro￿ts. Therefore in an o⁄er by Bank E,
IC H must bind.
17When a borrower is indi⁄erent between loan contracts o⁄ered by two banks, where one bank makes positive
pro￿ts and other bank zero, then the bank that makes positive pro￿ts can lower its pro￿ts by ￿ > 0 and o⁄er the
borrower greater utility. The bank making zero pro￿ts cannot do so and still break even.
12To derive a complete characterization of equilibria, I hold the entrant￿ s cost of funds constant
at ￿E and vary the incumbent￿ s cost of funds ￿I. In what follows, I will describe the equilibria for
situations where entrant has the cost advantage, that is, ￿I > ￿E; ￿rst, for the entrant￿ s o⁄er of
a separating contract (Proposition 1) and then for its o⁄er of a pooling contract (Proposition 2).
Details of the equilibria for ￿I ￿ ￿E, along with all the proofs, are provided in Appendix A. Finally,
this section concludes with a summary of the characterization of equilibria (see Table 1 and Figure
2).
I begin by describing the solution to a particular case of this problem, namely the situation in
which the entrant bank can successfully screen borrowers. As will be described shortly, the entrant
bank cannot always successfully screen borrowers; it can only do so when its cost advantage is
su¢ ciently large, that is, when ￿I is greater than the screening cuto⁄ ~ ￿S ￿
￿E
1￿(1￿￿)￿L. This case is
discussed in the next paragraph and the optimal contract for the entrant when ￿I ￿ ~ ￿S is derived
in Appendix B. The optimal contract derived in Appendix B helps in building the intuition behind
the screening cuto⁄ ~ ￿S described in Proposition 1(a).
Bank E can successfully sort all borrowers only if its incentive scheme yields at least as much
utility as contracts o⁄ered by Bank I. Consequently, Bank E faces borrowers whose reservation
utilities are determined by the maximum utility that Bank I can o⁄er borrowers, that is, ￿ UI
k(￿I).






1￿￿H. This inequality holds for all ￿I, given the earlier assumption
￿I < (1￿￿H)x￿U0. Stated di⁄erently, Bank E￿ s optimization problem can be viewed as that of a
monopolist facing borrowers with type-dependent reservation utilities ￿ UI
k(￿I) that satisfy counter-
vailing incentives.18 Appendix B provides the solution to this optimization problem. Note that the
solution is built on the premise that the entrant is able to dominate the incumbent.19 Evidently,
this does not hold true for all values of ￿I > ￿E. The equilibria in such cases are discussed in
Proposition 1(b) given below.
Proposition 1 (a) If ￿I ￿ ~ ￿S > ￿E and ￿ > ￿1, where ~ ￿S ￿
￿E




, then the incumbent o⁄ers (R
ﬂ
I
H;0) to high-risks and (R
ﬂ
I
L;0) to low-risks. The
18As mentioned earlier, Freixas and Rochet (1997) require countervailing incentives, the exogenous condition (1),
to show an uninformed lender￿ s use of collateral as a screening equilibrium. Note that, here, this condition is derived
endogenously.


















If ￿I > ~ ￿S, the entrant captures all borrowers and its expected pro￿ts from all loans are strictly
positive. If ￿I = ~ ￿S, low-risks borrow from either bank but high-risks borrow only from the entrant.
Expected pro￿ts from loans to low-risks are zero but the entrant￿ s pro￿ts from loans to high-risks
are strictly positive.














L) = 0. The incumbent o⁄ers (R
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L). High-risks go to the entrant but the incumbent retains the low-risks.
Banks￿expected pro￿ts from loans disbursed are strictly positive.
The equilibrium in Proposition 1(a) provides a cut-o⁄ ~ ￿S ￿
￿E
1￿(1￿￿)￿L such that, when ￿I >
~ ￿S, the entrant can capture all borrowers by o⁄ering a separating contract. How does the entrant￿ s
cost advantage help in competing with its informed rival? Clearly, a bank with lower cost generates
a greater surplus from loans to borrowers than its rival. Thus, it is able to provide a borrower the
maximum surplus that its rival can generate (from loans to the same borrower) and still retain
a part of the surplus for itself. Providing this surplus is easy when the lender can distinguish
borrower type but more di¢ cult when the lender has to sort borrowers. As noted earlier, sorting
borrowers with a positive collateral requirement C(> 0) is costly because it implies a deadweight
loss of (1 ￿ ￿)￿C. In Appendix B it is shown that, in a separating equilibrium where the entrant
captures the low-risks, it requires the low-risks to secure loans with collateral CE
L = ￿I. But, in
the event of failure (which occurs with probability ￿L), the entrant gets only ￿￿I after liquidation:
an expected loss of (1 ￿ ￿)￿L￿I. Since the entrant factors in such ex post deadweight losses in
calculating pro￿ts ex ante, a simple cost advantage ￿E < ￿I is insu¢ cient to capture low-risks. A
greater cost advantage is needed to overcome this informational disadvantage; the condition under
which the entrant dominates the incumbent is given by ￿E < ￿I ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿L￿I (Proposition 1a).
When the entrant dominates the incumbent by using a separating contract, it gives borrowers
two options: the ￿rst merely matches the incumbent￿ s o⁄er to high-risks, but the second o⁄ers
a cheaper loan rate than the incumbent￿ s o⁄er to low-risks. However, among borrowers with
indistinguishable risk, the entrant o⁄ers the second to only those who pledge collateral. Note that,
since CE
L = ￿I, this collateral requirement increases with the entrant￿ s cost advantage (recall that
14Figure 1: Equilibrium for the case ~ ￿ > ￿I > ￿E. Bank I o⁄ers A0 to the H-types and C0 to the L-types. Bank
E o⁄ers the menu (A0; B0). Here Bank E￿ s pro￿ts from the contract B0 are zero, but Bank I makes positive
pro￿ts from contract C0. Bank I￿ s pro￿ts from the contract A0 is zero, but Bank E makes positive pro￿ts from the
same contract. Banks split the market; the high-risk types borrow from the entrant and the low-risk types borrow
from the incumbent.
the model assumes that all entrepreneurs have unconstrained access to collateral). In the next
section, these results are used to explain why foreign banks tend to lend less to smaller ￿rms.
The equilibrium described in Proposition 1(b) holds for all values of ￿. Strictly speaking, Propo-
sition 1(b) characterizes a candidate equilibrium; if there is no pooling contract that does better
for the entrant, then this candidate will be the equilibrium. Figure 1 illustrates the (candidate)
equilibrium in Proposition 1(b) in (R;C) space. Borrowers￿payo⁄s increase as one moves south-
west, while lenders￿pro￿ts increase going northeast. Indi⁄erence curves for borrowers (indicated
by UH and UL) are given by the pairs of thin lines: high-risks have steeper indi⁄erence curves
than low-risks (single-crossing property). Line 1 (in bold) passing through (R
ﬂ
E
L;0) is the entrant￿ s
zero-pro￿t line for L-types. Note that it is ￿ atter than the indi⁄erence curves for L-types. The bro-
ken line 2 passing through (Rmin
P ;0) is the locus of (RE
L;CE















L)] = 0. This line passes through ( ￿ RE
L; ￿ CE






L)] makes zero pro￿ts from both H-types and L-types. Clearly, the
entrant￿ s o⁄ers in ZE(￿E) lie in the shaded region, bounded from below by lines 1 and 2. Bank
I o⁄ers A0 to the H-types and C0 to the L-types. Bank E o⁄ers the menu (A0; B0). Here, Bank
E￿ s pro￿ts from contract B0 are zero, but Bank I makes positive pro￿ts from contract C0. On the
other hand, Bank I￿ s pro￿ts from contract A0 are zero, but Bank E makes positive pro￿ts from
the same contract. Accordingly, banks split the market; the high-risks borrow from the entrant
and the low-risks borrow from the incumbent. Note that Bank E attracts both borrower types if it





L)]. However, it chooses menu (A0; B0) that yields higher pro￿ts
overall. By holding ￿E constant, the entrant￿ s o⁄ers in ZE(￿E) are ￿xed to the shaded region in




It follows that di⁄erent ￿I give rise to di⁄erent equilibria in the model. These include equilibria
where the entrant pools borrowers as given by the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If ￿ ￿ ￿1 and ￿I > ~ ￿2












L(￿I);0). The incumbent￿ s best response is to o⁄er (R
ﬂ
I




the low-risks. The entrant captures all borrowers and its expected pro￿ts overall are non-negative.
Figure 2 characterizes two non-linear bounds for the entrant￿ s pooling contracts, ~ ￿1
P(￿) and
~ ￿2
P(￿) that are both strictly increasing and strictly convex in ￿. The ￿rst bound ~ ￿1
P(￿) ￿ ( 1￿￿L
1￿E￿)￿E,
characterizes a feasibility condition for the entrant￿ s pooling contracts; the entrant can successfully
pool borrowers only if ￿I > ~ ￿1
P(￿). First, note that for ￿I ￿ ~ ￿1
P(￿), the entrant fails to pool
borrowers because the incumbent undercuts the entrant￿ s o⁄er to capture low-risk types. Second,
this bound is increasing in ￿, indicating that a higher cost advantage is required to pool borrowers in
markets characterized by stronger information asymmetries. Finally, for all such pooling contracts,
the entrant￿ s pro￿ts from loans to low-risks are always greater than that from loans to high-risks.
In fact, if entrant￿ s cost advantage is not too large, it subsidizes losses from high-risks with pro￿ts
from low-risk borrowers. Consequently, the entrant￿ s choice of a pooling contract is optimal only if
the proportion of high-risks in the borrower population is su¢ ciently small (￿ ￿ ￿1).
This gives a second bound, ~ ￿2
P(￿) (for ￿ ￿ ￿1), which characterizes an optimality condition
for the entrant￿ s pooling contracts; if ￿I > ~ ￿2
P(￿) and ￿ ￿ ￿1, the entrant￿ s optimal strategy is to
pool all borrowers. This second bound determines the entrant￿ s choice between its pooling option
16Figure 2: The entrant￿ s cost is ￿xed at ￿E and the ￿gure describes equilibria for varying levels of the incumbent￿ s
cost ￿I. The shaded region II shows the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 (b). The incumbent dominates in
region I, while the entrant dominates by sorting borrowers in region III and by pooling them in region IV.
(Proposition 2) and its o⁄er of a contract that captures high-risk borrowers only (Proposition
1b). Notice that when ~ ￿2
P(￿) ￿ ￿I > ~ ￿1
P(￿) and ￿ ￿ ￿1, the entrant can capture all borrowers by
o⁄ering a pooling contract that cross subsidizes high-risks with pro￿ts from low-risk types. Instead,
it o⁄ers a separating contract as given in Proposition 1(b). Although this contract captures high-
risk borrowers but not low-risk ones, it yields higher pro￿ts than the entrant￿ s pooling option. The
converse is true for ￿I > ~ ￿2
P(￿) and ￿ ￿ ￿1. This second bound is increasing in ￿, showing that a
higher cost advantage is required to o⁄set the subsidies to a larger proportion of high-risks in the
population. Note that when ￿ = ￿1, ~ ￿2
P(￿) = ~ ￿S.
In summary, the entrant uses a pooling contract if and only if (i) the entrant has a su¢ ciently
large cost advantage and (ii) the proportion of high-risk borrowers in the population is small, as
given by region IV in Figure 2. Since the entrant￿ s o⁄er of a pooling contract has a zero collat-
eral requirement, competition between the entrant and the incumbent here is much like Bertrand
competition as modeled in DM (2004).20
20The equilibrium discussed here is similar to the situation in DM (2004) where the entrant emerges as a contestable
monopolist. Just like in our model, Bank 2 (entrant) is a contestable monopolist if (i) proportion of unknown borrowers
(￿) (their proxy for the degree of information asymmetry) is high and (ii) the entrant￿ s cost of funds (￿) is low. See
DM (2004), Figure 1, p.192.
17TABLE 1. Characterization of Equilibria
Bank￿ s cost of funds Contract used Borrower H Borrower L Bank I￿ s pro￿ts Bank E￿ s pro￿ts
by entrant goes to goes to high-risk low-risk high-risk low-risk
￿I < ￿E separating Bank I Bank I + + (x) (x)
￿I = ￿E separating either bank Bank I 0 + 0 (x)
(￿)~ ￿S > ￿I > ￿E separating Bank E Bank I (x) + + (x)
~ ￿S = ￿I and ￿ > ￿1 separating Bank E either bank (x) 0 + 0
￿I > ~ ￿S and ￿ > ￿1 separating Bank E Bank E (x) (x) + +
￿I > ~ ￿2
P(￿) and ￿ ￿ ￿1 pooling Bank E Bank E (x) (x) +=￿ +
(￿) These candidate equilibria become equilibria of the model for either ￿ > ￿1 or when both ￿ ￿ ￿1 and ￿
I ￿ ~ ￿
2
P.
Positive, negative and zero pro￿ts of a bank are denoted by the signs +, ￿ and 0 respectively. The sign (x) implies
that the bank does not get the borrower.
Table 1 summarizes the equilibrium outcomes and shows how the cost advantage of the entrant
helps to overcome the information advantage of the incumbent. When the incumbent has both
the cost and information advantage, it emerges as a contestable monopolist: it can match any
o⁄er by the entrant and still make positive pro￿ts. Recall that the entrant always o⁄ers a zero-
collateral contract to high-risks. Therefore, the bank with the lower cost of funds captures high-risk
borrowers. Moreover, if neither bank has the cost advantage, both entrant and incumbent can get
the high-risks, but in competing with each other, pro￿ts from loans to high-risks are run down
to zero. To illustrate why the entrant cannot capture low-risks when ￿I = ￿E, recall that it is
a dominated strategy for Bank E to o⁄er contract (R
ﬂ
E







L; and although the incumbent can always o⁄er (R
ﬂ
I
L(￿I);0) to low-risks, the entrant cannot
match this o⁄er with contract (R
ﬂ
E
L(￿E);0). This characterization of equilibria for ￿I ￿ ￿E is given
by region I in Figure 2.
The importance of the (candidate) separating equilibrium can be understood for situations
where ￿I < ~ ￿S (see Figure 2). First, consider situations where it is optimal for the entrant to
pool borrowers (i.e., ￿ ￿ ￿1), but o⁄ering a pooling contract is infeasible because ￿I ￿ ~ ￿1
P(￿).
Nevertheless, the entrant can capture high-risks in such situations using contracts in ZE
S (￿E). For
example, if ￿ ￿ ￿1 and ~ ￿1
P(￿) ￿ ￿I > ￿E, the candidate equilibrium in Proposition 1(b) emerges
as the equilibrium of the game. Second, as noted earlier, with ~ ￿2
P(￿) ￿ ￿I > ~ ￿1
P(￿) the entrant
18o⁄ers a separating contract as given in Proposition 1(b), despite the fact that it can o⁄er a pooling
contract and capture all borrowers. Third, the same logic applies in situations where ~ ￿S > ￿I >
~ ￿1
P(￿) and ￿ > ￿1.
The three situations described above belong to the set of equilibria given by Proposition 1(b), in
which the entrant cannot capture the high-quality (low-risk) borrowers despite its cost advantage.
This set is characterized by the shaded region II in Figure 2. Only when the entrant￿ s cost advantage
is su¢ ciently large does it dominate the incumbent and capture all borrowers. Figure 2 provides
a characterization of these equilibria. Region III characterizes the entrant￿ s o⁄er of a separating
contract as given in Proposition 1(a). Equilibria for the entrant￿ s pooling contract in Proposition
2 are shown as region IV.
4 Implications of the model
I show next that the lessons gleaned from this highly stylized model can be of general interest.
To this end, I discuss some of the important theoretical results (and their associated empirical
predictions) in terms of the existing empirical evidence on foreign entry into credit markets.
Domestic welfare
A simple prediction of this model is that the removal of entry barriers lowers the rates at which
credit is available to borrowers. Note that even when the incumbent has both cost and informa-
tion advantage, relaxing entry restrictions means that it can no longer extract the entire surplus
generated from loans. The threat of entry forces the incumbent (contestable monopolist) to pro-
vide borrowers the surplus that a potential competitor could provide in such situations. Thus, the
removal of entry barriers in credit markets signi￿cantly raises borrower payo⁄s. This initial result
agrees with empirical studies like Jayaratne and Strahan (1996, 1998) that ￿nd declines in average
loan prices of about 40 basis points following branching deregulation in the US.
Interestingly, a rise in pro￿ts for the foreign entrant is matched by a corresponding decline in
pro￿ts for its domestic rival (incumbent). Does foreign entry in banking hurt the domestic economy?
Two key features of the model can help answer this question. First, poaching the incumbent￿ s
19clients is possible only if the entrant provides them the surplus that the incumbent can generate
from loans. From a domestic country perspective, the entry of foreign banks redistributes the
surplus from domestic banks to borrowers. Second, the entrant can successfully attract borrowers
only when it has the cost advantage. By virtue of its lower cost of funds, the entrant bank generates
a greater surplus from a loan contract than the incumbent. These expected e¢ ciency gains can be
passed on to the borrowers. For instance, when the entrant o⁄ers a pooling contract, high-risks
obtain a strictly greater yield than that provided by the domestic bank. To summarize, under no
equilibrium are domestic agents (banks and borrowers) worse o⁄ in aggregate.
Small business lending, cream skimming and foreign banks
Claessens et al. (2001) show that the e⁄ect of foreign entry is very di⁄erent in developed versus
developing countries. First, they ￿nd that foreign banks have lower pro￿ts than domestic banks
in developed countries, but the opposite is true in developing countries. Second, their estimation
results suggest that an increased presence of foreign banks leads to a lower pro￿tability for domestic
banks. Not surprisingly, a concern among policymakers and economists, particularly in emerging
markets, is that foreign banks ￿cream skim￿or ￿cherry pick￿ , leaving the worst risks to the domestic
banks. A related issue is that foreign banks (and large domestic banks) tend to lend more to large
￿rms, thereby neglecting small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (Stiglitz, 2000; Berger et al. 2001,
2005; Clarke et al. 2001). Evidence in favor of this bias exists for the US (Berger and Udell, 1995;
Berger et al. 2005) and for developing countries like Argentina (Berger et al. 2001). Clarke et
al. (2001) ￿nd that foreign bank entry improves ￿nancing conditions for enterprises of all sizes,
although larger ￿rms bene￿t more. However, their study does not distinguish whether foreign banks
provide credit to both large ￿rms and SMEs, or foreign bank competition for large customers leads
domestic banks to increase SME credit.21
The evidence discussed above can be rationalized in terms of the model. Notice that the model
characterizes di⁄erent equilibria for di⁄erent degrees of the entrant￿ s cost (e¢ ciency) advantage. A
likely scenario for developed countries is that the foreign entrant￿ s cost advantage is signi￿cantly
21This issue is further complicated by di⁄erent macroeconomic conditions across countries and by the role of
domestic banks in these countries. For instance, in the context of emerging markets like India, there is evidence of
even public sector banks rationing credit to a section of domestic ￿rms (Banerjee and Du￿ o, 2001).
20small. The model predicts that for very low degrees of cost advantage, like ￿E < ￿I < ~ ￿1
P(￿),
an entrant can attract only high-risk borrowers from among the incumbent￿ s clients. Since the
incumbent almost always retains borrowers of higher quality, this could explain why foreign banks
record lower pro￿ts than their domestic counterparts in developed economies.
In contrast, the entrant￿ s cost advantage in developing countries is likely to be higher. Depending
on how large this e¢ ciency advantage is, the theory points to two possible scenarios. When this
advantage is su¢ ciently large (￿I > ~ ￿S), the entrant can use pooling and separating contracts to
dominate the incumbent. However, for moderately high cost advantages, like ~ ￿S > ￿I > ~ ￿1
P(￿), only
a pooling contract allows the entrant to capture all borrowers. In summary, the model predicts that
for larger cost advantages, the foreign bank can dominate its domestic counterpart, particularly
in sectors where the domestic banks￿clients are of superior quality (low-risk). This accounts both
for foreign banks recording higher pro￿ts than domestic banks in emerging markets and for an
increased presence of foreign banks reducing the pro￿tability of domestic banks, consistent with
the ￿ndings in Claessens et al. (2001).
For moderately high cost advantages, the entrant￿ s ability to attract low-risk borrowers depends
on the value of ￿. This could explain, for example, the di⁄erences in the observed lending behavior
of foreign banks in di⁄erent market segments. To see this, consider the (domestic) borrower market
as composed of di⁄erent market segments, each with its own value of ￿. For example, a lower
￿ (smaller proportion of high-risks) characterizes a market segment where the average borrower
quality is higher. By pooling both risk types, the entrant captures all of the incumbent￿ s clients in
these market segments. On the other hand, the entrant (despite its cost advantage) fails to screen
borrowers in markets segments characterized by a high ￿ (region II in Figure 2). In these segments,
the entrant can attract only high-risks.
This stylized result has two important implications. First, it helps provide an interpretation of
the policymakers￿concern about foreign banks "cream-skimming" domestic borrowers.22 If "cream-
skimming" is interpreted as dominance over better-quality market segments, then the entrant bank￿ s
ability to capture all borrowers in high quality (low ￿) market segments can be viewed as cream-
22Given our assumption that the foreign entrant faces an information disadvantage, it seems paradoxical to think
of a foreign bank cream-skimming borrowers. Although, a foreign bank may choose to cream-skim borrowers based
on observable risk.
21skimming. On the other hand, if cream skimming is interpeted as the entrant￿ s ability to capture
only the low-risk types, then the results show that it is not possible for the entrant to cream-skim
domestic borrowers.23 Second, the result can also explain the precieved lending bias of foreign
banks against SMEs. As is well known, small business lending is based on "soft information" and is
characterized by a larger proportion of borrowers that are high-risk (in terms of this model, a high
￿). On the other hand, the large-￿rm market segment can be characterized by a larger proportion
of borrowers that low risk (i.e., characterized by low ￿). With a moderately high cost advantage,
the entrant captures all borrowers in this market. However, in markets characterized by a high
￿ (as is true for SMEs), the incumbent, despite its cost disadvantage, retains the low-risk types.
Whereas the entrant gains all borrowers in the large-￿rm market segment, it succeeds in attracting
only a fraction of the borrower population in the small-￿rm segment, accounting for the observed
bias in lending.
Legal protection
In markets with a larger fraction of high-risk borrowers (higher ￿), a low cost entrant can successfully
sort borrowers only if its cost advantage is su¢ ciently large (region III in Figure 2). Securing loans
with collateral entails a deadweight loss of (1 ￿ ￿)￿L￿I. This loss is high in environments where
￿ is low; that is, when dissipative costs of seizing and liquidating collateral are high.24 The
parameter ￿ is the fraction of the pledged collateral that the lender can recover in the event of a
default on the loan. Stated di⁄erently, ￿ can be viewed as a proxy for legal e¢ ciency, with higher
￿s corresponding to better legal enforcement.25 Either way, stronger creditor protection and/or
23Admittedly, I have assumed that the entrant has the informational disadvantage. However, note that the
principal-agent literature discusses cream-skimming by an uninformed principal (entrant) as an equilibrium where the
ine¢ cient agent (high-risk borrower) can be priced out of the market (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005, p. 604). This
involves the entrant o⁄ering a shutdown contract that is accepted only by the e¢ cient agent (low-risk borrower), but
rejected by his ine¢ cient counterpart (La⁄ont and Martimort, 2002, p. 38). However, this model shows that under
competitive pressures from the incumbent, the entrant cannot o⁄er a shutdown contract in equilibrium. Moreover, in
a separating equilibrium where the entrant dominates, the entrant￿ s ex ante expected pro￿ts from high-risk borrowers
are always greater than that from low-risk borrowers. Thus, the entrant would not choose to cream-skim low-risk
borrowers.
24This could range from direct costs, like legal fees and accounting services, to indirect costs like time and e⁄ort
in acquiring and selling the secured asset. Also, deadweight losses may arise from information and holdout problems
that characterize ￿nancial distress (Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991; James, 1996).
25A caveat in this interpretation is that some of the debate on the distribution of rights between creditor and debtor
is misguided. Stiglitz (2001, p. 4) observes "what is critical is the clarity of those rights; presumably, the terms of the
contract can be adjusted to re￿ ect those rights....Di⁄erent bankruptcy rules do impose di⁄erent information burdens
22better law enforcement reduces the losses from default and thus encourages entrants to bid more
aggressively for borrowers. This leads to a testable prediction of the model:
Prediction : Ceteris paribus, countries with bankruptcy codes that reduce the cost of liquidating
collateral should witness greater foreign bank lending.
The entrant￿ s success in gaining borrowers of higher quality by o⁄ering cheaper loans is su¢ -
ciently enhanced by increasing the e¢ ciency of collateral use. In a recent study on how legal changes
a⁄ect lending behavior, Haselmann et al. (2005) ￿nd that lending volume increases subsequent to
legal changes facilitating the use of collateral, and that foreign green￿eld banks extend their lending
volume substantially more than domestic banks. Markets where creditor rights provide stronger
protection to lenders will witness lower deadweight losses both in the repossession and in the liq-
uidation of collateral; this, in turn, will promote entry of low-cost competitors. The argument
above summarizes how an e¢ cient legal framework helps in building an e¢ cient ￿nancial market
by promoting entry of low-cost competitors. It provides a theoretical underpinning for empirical
￿ndings on the legal determinants of the development of ￿nancial intermediaries like banks (Levine
1998, 1999).
It is worthwhile to recall that stronger legal protection (higher ￿, and consequently, a lower
~ ￿S) makes it easier for entrants to sort borrowers. Conversely, poor legal practices that increase
deadweight losses (a higher ~ ￿S) can exacerbate the di¢ culties that foreign entrants face in lending
to informationally opaque small ￿rms. This result in the model explains why the foriegn banks￿
bias against SMEs appears stronger in emerging markets, where deadweight losses, both in the
repossession and in the liquidation of collateral, can be quite large. As stated above, this has
important policy implications for host countries: better creditor protection can facilitate foreign
bank lending to small businesses.
Borrowers with collateral constraints
The previous result begs the following question: does the entrant￿ s large ￿rm bias disappear if it can
successfully screen high-risk borrowers? This model can be extended to show that the uninformed
lender￿ s bias towards larger ￿rms can persist even if lending towards SMEs as a whole increase.
and imply di⁄erent allocations of risk bearing, and some of these arrangements may actually be ine¢ cient."
23Here, the separating equilibria in this framework identify a di⁄erent mechanism at work. The
earlier assumption that borrowers have unconstrained access to collateral is relaxed. In particular,
it is assumed that there exists a distribution of borrowers (￿rms) who di⁄er in their ability to post
collateral. More speci￿cally, I now assume that within a group of borrowers with indistinguishable
risk, larger ￿rms can readily post more collateral (per dollar of borrowings) whereas smaller ￿rms
can only pledge a lower C. This new assumption alters little in terms of equilibrium behavior of
banks. In particular, one can focus attention on the equilibrium described in Proposition 1(a).
Note that, if the entrant reduces the collateral requirement for low-risks, incentive compatibility
requires that it reduce loan rates for the high-risks as well. Also, it can be shown that the entrant￿ s
pro￿ts from the high-risks (￿E
H) are greater than that from low-risks (￿E
L) (See Appendix B):
￿E
H = ￿I ￿ ￿E
and ￿E
L = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿L]￿I ￿ ￿E: (6)
Given that the pro￿ts from high-risks are strictly greater than that from low-risks, the entrant
will not alter its collateral requirement for low-risks as long as the proportion of high-risks in the
population is large (￿ > ^ ￿). Simply put, the entrant o⁄ers the following two options: (i) loans at
a rate similar to the domestic bank￿ s o⁄er to high-risks and (ii) loans at a rate cheaper than the
domestic bank￿ s o⁄er to low-risks, but only to those who pledge collateral CE
L = ￿I. In terms of the
model, this implies that among borrowers with indistinguishable risk, the cheaper loan is available
only to those willing to pledge collateral. This result gives another prediction of this model:
Prediction : Conditional on observable risk, entrants to a credit market provide cheaper loans
only to those borrowers who are willing to pledge (more) collateral.
From a borrower￿ s perspective, it appears that o⁄ers by the entrant are biased towards larger
￿rms that can readily post collateral. Low-risk borrowers that cannot post this collateral will go to
the (informed) local bank. This result accounts for the perceived bias in the entrant￿ s separating
contracts: larger ￿rms that can post collateral go to the entrant, while the incumbent attracts only
low-risk borrowers that are constrained in their ability to post collateral.
An important consideration here is that small ￿rms tend to be observationally riskier than
24large ￿rms. However, within the same categories of observable risk, it is likely that larger ￿rms
can readily ful￿l the collateral requirement that smaller ￿rms cannot. There is some evidence in
support of this phenomenon: Haynes et al. (2001) show that the smallest among small business
borrowers in the US have less access to credit from large banks than other small business borrowers.
Again, one can explain why this problem turns out to be greater in emerging markets. First,
note that the information problems are likely to be more acute (greater ￿) in developing countries.
Second, the entrant￿ s cost advantage is also likely to be greater (higher ￿I). In terms of the
model, a greater cost advantage implies a higher collateral requirement (CE
L = ￿I). Finally, the
collateralizable wealth of borrowers tends to be lower in developing countries. These three factors
can combine to make this bias against SMEs seem more acute in developing countries.
5 Conclusion
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. To the best of my knowledge, it is the ￿rst
paper that analyzes bank competition as competition between asymmetrically informed principals
where contract menus (loan rates and collateral) are the strategic variables of competition. This
theoretical approach has some important advantages.
First, it helps tie the early literature on information theories of credit to more recent studies
in law and ￿nance under a single framework. In a recent paper, Djankov et al. (2004) classify
the literature on private credit into two broad, but interlinked categories: information theories of
credit and theories that stress the importance of creditors￿rights. This paper demonstrates how
these two categories are interlinked; it supports their assertions that better legal environment can
help overcome the stronger informational disadvantages that potential entrants encounter in credit
markets. Conversely, limited property rights and poorly functioning legal systems can combine
to reduce the use of collateralizable assets, thereby diminishing potential entrants￿ability to sort
borrowers. This conclusion from the model provides a theoretical underpinning for recent empirical
studies on the importance of legal environments in explaining the variation in the size of private
credit markets.
Second, as shown in the previous section, the results in this paper ￿nd support in empirical work
25related to foreign entry in banking. Furthermore, the model makes two testable predictions. First,
ceteris paribus, countries with bankruptcy codes that reduce the cost for seizing and liquidating
collateral should witness greater foreign bank lending, particularly to SMEs. Second, the model
predicts that in lending to observably riskier borrowers (like small ￿rms) entrants to a credit market
are likely to provide cheaper loans only to borrowers pledging more collateral. As mentioned earlier,
these predictions on collateral use depend on borrowers￿unobservable risk characteristics as opposed
to previous studies that discuss observable risk.
Third, the model allows us to explore the impact of entry and bank competition on ￿rms￿access
to credit. In particular, this model can explain the perceived bias that foreign (and large domestic)
banks lend more to large ￿rms thereby neglecting small enterprises. At the same time, it also
explains why better informed domestic and local banks continue to ￿nd a market among such small
￿rms. Lastly, it shows why this bias can be stronger in developing countries.
A ￿nal observation is that cream skimming by foreign banks can be rationalized if one de-
￿nes cream-skimming as capturing market segments of higher (average) quality. However, cream-
skimming interpreted as the poaching of only high-quality borrowers in a given market segment is
not an equilibrium in this framework. On the contrary, this paper suggests that entrants with a
cost advantage have to engage in costly screening only for the better ￿rms, not the high-risk ones.
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Appendix A: Proofs
The outlines of the proofs for Lemmas 1-3, Propositions 1-2, and the description of equilibria for situations
where ￿I ￿ ￿E are given below. The details of some of the proofs provided here are available in the Extended
Appendix.







k and k = H;L. With UM
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k ￿ ￿N
k = ￿k(1 ￿ ￿)(CN
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k ) > 0. Therefore, it must be true that
￿M
k > ￿N
k . Bank I will always choose a contract that sets its collateral requirement to zero. It is easy to
show that ￿I
k ￿ 0; k = H;L for all such contracts.
(A.2) Proof of Lemma 2 Let us consider two menus of contracts where ^ RE
H > ~ RE
H and ^ CE
H < ~ CE
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L)] will (a) satisfy the participation and incentive compatibility con-
straints for all borrowers and (b) result in higher pro￿ts for the entrant (see Extended Appendix for details).
Hence the entrant￿ s o⁄er sets collateral requirement of the high-risk borrower to zero; this is true for both
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L)] results in higher pro￿ts for Bank E (see Extended Appendix for details). (ii) holds
because Bank E can always choose to stay out. (iii). From (ii) it follows that if ￿E




L) means that L-types either go to the incumbent or they choose the contract
(RE
H;0) originally selected by the H-types. In both cases Bank E￿ s pro￿ts are higher.
29(A.4) Proof of Proposition 1 (a) In order to ensure that both high-risk and low-risk borrow
from it, the entrant￿ s o⁄er in ZE
S (￿E) must yield at least ￿ UI
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leads to unambiguously higher pro￿ts while ensuring that low-risks accept the new contract. Therefore, the






When the entrant dominates, one can focus attention on contracts in ZE






L;0).26 Consider two such menus [( ￿ RE
H;0);( ￿ RE
L; ￿ CE
L)] and [( ^ RE
H;0);( ^ RE
L; ^ CE
L)] such that ￿ RE
L < ^ RE
L,
￿ CE
L > ^ CE
L . It follows that ￿ RE
H > ^ RE
H. From UL( ￿ RE
L; ￿ CE
L) = UL( ^ RE
L; ^ CE
L), one gets
(1 ￿ ￿L)( ￿ RE
L ￿ ^ RE
L) = ￿L( ^ CE
L ￿ ￿ CE
L). (A.1)
Also, UH( ^ RE
L; ^ CE
L) = UH( ^ RE
H;0) with UH( ￿ RE
L; ￿ CE
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RHS is positive for ￿ > ￿1. Intuitively, the entrant charges a higher RE
H when the proportion of high-
risks in the population is high and (a) follows. Solving the last two equations, one gets RE
L = CE
L = ￿I
and the entrant￿ s pro￿ts are strictly positive when [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿L]￿I > ￿E and this gives us the cut-o⁄
~ ￿S ￿
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run down pro￿ts to zero pro￿ts and the low-risk borrower borrows from either bank.
(b) Finally, when ￿I < ~ ￿S it follows that ￿E
L(RE
L;CE
L) < 0. In this situation, the entrant is forced to
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L, and Bank I now makes positive pro￿ts from the low-risk borrower.









H and the entrant makes positive
pro￿ts of the high-risk borrower. Thus, in this equilibrium, the high-risk borrower borrows from Bank E
while her low-risk counterpart borrows from Bank I (see Figure 1).
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H. Conversely, if ￿I ￿ ( 1￿￿L
1￿￿H)￿E, the entrant covers expected losses from high-risks
with pro￿ts from low-risks. Comparing the entrant￿ s pro￿ts from pooling and separating contracts, one can
show that the entrant chooses the pooling contract only when ￿ ￿ ￿1 (see (B.8) in Appendix B). Note that,
for ￿I ￿ ~ ￿S, the entrant gets the high-risk borrower only. Here comparing pro￿ts, gives us the second cuto⁄
26For all such contract o⁄ers, increasing entrant￿ s pro￿ts from high-risks (by raising RE
H) implies lowering
pro￿ts from low-risks (lowering RE
L and raising CE
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L). Note that if ￿I < ￿E, the incumbent
captures all borrowers but if ￿I = ￿E, Borrower-H borrows from either bank but Borrower-L borrows from
the incumbent only (see Extended Appendix for details).
Appendix B: Entrant￿ s optimization problem for ￿I ￿ ~ ￿S(￿
￿E
1￿(1￿￿)￿L).
Bank E￿ s problem can be viewed as a principal facing agents under incomplete information where the agents￿
outside opportunities are determined by the max. utilities that Bank I can provide. Borrower goes to Bank
E only if it o⁄ers an incentive scheme yielding at least, maximum utility, ￿ UI
k, i.e., reservation utility in
borrower￿ s IR constraint is now ￿ UI
k.
Max ￿[(1 ￿ ￿H)RE
H + ￿￿HCE
H ￿ ￿E] + (1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿L)RE
L + ￿￿LCE
L ￿ ￿E] (B.2)
subject to (1 ￿ ￿H)(x ￿ RE
H) ￿ ￿HCE
H ￿ ￿ UI
H; (B.2a)
(1 ￿ ￿L)(x ￿ RE
L) ￿ ￿LCE
L ￿ ￿ UI
L; (B.2b)
(1 ￿ ￿H)(x ￿ RE
H) ￿ ￿HCE
H ￿ (1 ￿ ￿H)(x ￿ RE
L) ￿ ￿HCE
L; (B.2c)
(1 ￿ ￿L)(x ￿ RE
L) ￿ ￿LCE
L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿L)(x ￿ RE
H) ￿ ￿LCE
H (B.2d)
The following results hold in equilibrium (i) the H-types are not required to put down any collateral, CE
H = 0;
(ii) ICH (B.2c) must bind and (iii) IRH (B.2a) must bind (see Extended Appendix). Now, the constraints
in (B.2) can be written in terms of a single constraint in CE
L as follows










= ￿I; [using(4)] (B.3)









H;S = 0; and RE
L;S = ￿I, CE
L;S = ￿I. (B.4)
Bank E leaves both types of borrowers at ￿ UI
k￿ the maximum Bank I bank can give borrowers. Moreover,
Bank E￿ s expected pro￿ts from high-risks (￿E
H) and low-risks (￿E
L)are given by
￿E
H = ￿I ￿ ￿E and ￿E
L = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿L]￿I ￿ ￿E: (B.5)
Bank I￿ s pro￿ts from providing each borrower ￿ UI
k, are zero. For both borrower types to accept loan contracts
from Bank E only, its pro￿ts must be strictly positive, i.e., ￿I > [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿L]￿I > ￿E. For Bank E￿ s









P = 0. (B.6)
31Given Bank E o⁄ers the pooling contract (R
ﬂ
I
L;0) its pro￿ts from low and high-risks are given by
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Note that, when Bank E o⁄ers a separating contract, its pro￿ts from loans to the high-risk borrower are
higher than pro￿ts from loans to low-risk borrowers. The converse is true for a pooling contract.
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